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A TRADITIONALIST CASE FOR GAY
MARRIAGE
DALE CARPENTER*
I will present here the outline of an argument for same-sex
marriage within a particular school of conservatism. Let's call it
traditionalism or Burkeanism, after the eighteenth century British
statesman and writer Edmund Burke. It is important, I think, to note
at the outset what I am not talking about. I am not talking about
libertarianism. It is not economic conservatism. It is not neo-
conservatism. It is not religious conservatism. And it is not
compassionate conservatism.
My aim is not to argue normatively for Burkean conservatism as
an approach to all social change and public policy. My own view is
that while it is generally preferable, there are times when it is not
appropriate. Emergency circumstances, for example, would not be a
time for Burkean incrementalism. It is also not my aim to make
constitutional arguments for a right to same-sex marriage. I could not
improve on the presentation by Dean Choper on that score,' and I will
not even try to do so. Instead, I am basically attempting to do five
things.
First of all, I will describe briefly what I mean by Burkean
conservatism. Second, I will sketch, based on that description, a case
against the recognition of gay marriages. Third, I will outline an
affirmative argument for same-sex marriage. Fourth, I will reconsider,
in the light of those arguments, the Burkean case against same-sex
marriage. Finally, I will discuss what a Burkean conservative ought to
say about the pace and the process for achieving same-sex marriage.
First, what do I mean by Burkean conservatism? The basic idea
of Burkean thought is that we should respect tradition and history.
We should, in general, prefer stability to change, the tried to the
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota School of Law. This piece is substantially based on Professor Carpenter's
presentation at SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW'S symposium, Gay Marriage in the
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1. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Can the Government Prohibit Gay
Marriage?, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 15 (2008).
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untried, and continuity to experiment.
I think the best quotation from Burke's writing that captures this
basic idea comes from his most famous work, Reflections on the
Revolution in France. He wrote:
[I]nstead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them
to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to
ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the
longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have
prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men
to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason;
because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that
the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the
general bank and capital of nations, and of ages.
Russell Kirk was a modern American disciple of Edmund Burke.
Reflecting on Burke's approach to the past and to change, Kirk wrote
that Burke did not believe we are condemned to a perpetual
retreading in the footsteps of our ancestors. Burke was obviously not
opposed to all evolution in a society that honors traditions and values.
That would be, as Burke once said, like trying to rock "a grown man
in the cradle of an infant." Instead, Burke counseled deliberation and
patience in reform. He said that we should base change on experience,
not on abstraction and not on philosophical principles divorced from
lived reality. Burke wanted a slow but well-sustained progress, and for
that reason, he supported incremental change rather than the kind of
convulsive upheaval he saw in events of his own time like the French
Revolution. Notably for Burke, even what we presently regard as
fundamental principles are not immune to critique and revision based
on the lessons derived from experience.
With that very brief primer on Burkean conservatism, how would
we sketch a case against the recognition of gay marriage? The case
would have four basic elements. First, gay marriage is, of course, a
change. Because of that alone, we should be resistant to it and
suspicious of it. Second, marriage is a long-standing cherished and
important institution that has never before in its history included the
union of a man and a man or a woman and a woman. This historic
practice of uniting men and women and not same-sex partners may
have a reason that our current logic cannot fully understand. Third,
gay marriage is being brought to us in the service of non-marital and
abstract causes, such as equality, inclusion, and tolerance. Fourth, and
worst of all perhaps, it is a radical change being thrust upon us
suddenly by impatient activists and courts. These activists and courts
have tended to be hostile, both to marriage itself and to tradition as a
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basis for law. That, I think, is the strongest case that one can make
against same-sex marriage using Burkean premises.
Against that Burkean critique, how might we construct a
response? We must begin with an observation that much of the public
policy toward homosexuals in this country was developed in a time
when, quite frankly, we did not know much about homosexuals, how
they lived, what they were like, how many there were, and so on. We
filled in the gaps in our knowledge with myths about homosexuals:
that they were dangerous, that they were predatory, especially toward
children, psychopathic, and maladjusted.
In the twentieth century, a process of medicalization of the
homosexual and of homosexuality occurred, in which homosexuality
was viewed as a kind of disease to be cured-not a physical one, but a
psychological one. This basic perspective has changed in the past
century, especially in the last fifty to sixty years as homosexuals came
out of the closet in large numbers and as homosexuality has become a
subject of systematic study and experience. From that study, a strong
consensus has developed in the scientific, medical, sociological, and
psychological communities about homosexuals. They are not mentally
ill or dangerous. They are much the same as heterosexuals in all
measures of adjustment and in terms of need for love and
companionship.
While we don't know with certainty what causes a person to have
a homosexual orientation, or a heterosexual orientation for that
matter, we do know that homosexuality as an orientation is not
consciously chosen and cannot easily be changed, if at all. It is not
contagious. As Judge Richard Posner pointed out in his book, Sex and
Reason, homosexuals are not created by recruitment or persuasion or
seduction.
There are people, of course, who dissent from one or more of
these propositions. It would be surprising in a country of some three
hundred million people not to find someone dissenting from these
views. But in contrast to the past, they now hold a distinctly minority
view that has, frankly, no good empirical or experiential support.
All of these are things that we did not know until the last fifty or
so years. Also, consider the dimensions of the issue. Conservatively
speaking, there are about nine million gay people in the United States
using a three percent baseline to estimate the number. According to a
2005 federal government estimate, there are about 770,000 same-sex
couple households in the United States. And that is almost certainly
2008]
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an undercount. That is, as Charles Murray has pointed out,2 a small
percentage of the whole population of the United States. If sacrificing
the interest of that larger group is required in order to recognize the
interests of this small minority, then that sacrifice is probably not
worthwhile.
The numbers of gay people and same-sex couple households in
the country are things that we did not count, and that the government
certainly did not count, until about two decades ago. When you think
about it, that is a considerable number of people who will never have
a reasonable prospect of marriage in their lives. It denies to them the
most powerful social and legal institution we have for encouraging
values that traditionalists hold dear such as commitment, fidelity, and
monogamy. Perhaps that denial is justified and we are right to
withhold these encouragements and incentives from homosexuals, but
at the very least, we have to recognize that a trade-off is involved.
According to the 2000 Census, about twenty percent of all of the
male couple households in the United States and thirty-three percent
of all the female couple households in the United States are raising
children. That might somewhat overestimate the percentages, but it is
not too far off. What we do know, using the most conservative
numbers available, is that there are at least one million children in this
country right now being raised either by single gay people or by gay
couples. None of these children have the protection and benefits that
marriage would provide to their families. We were unaware of the
dimensions of this phenomenon until recently, so we could easily
ignore or dismiss its growth and development. We no longer have that
excuse. The question now is, "Now that we know, what do we do?"
How might marriage help?
There are certainly possible benefits, both to individuals and to
communities, in the recognition of same-sex marriages. Let me first
discuss the possible individualistic benefits, some of which have
already been alluded to. Certainly for the couples who would
participate in same-sex marriages, there is little doubt, I think, that
marriage would improve their prospects as couples in the long-term
and enhance their lives in a number of ways. The only question really
on the table is what the magnitude of that benefit would be and
whether it would be as great as it is for heterosexual couples.
Certainly legal benefits are involved-more than a thousand of
them at the federal level and more importantly, even more at the state
2. See Charles Murray, Love Has Nothing to Do with It, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 77
(2008).
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level. Same-sex marriage advocates usually treat these legal benefits
as the most important benefits provided by the right to marry. I doubt
that is the case.
More important than the legal benefits are the caregiving
benefits. Marriage makes one other person responsible for your well-
being. Someone watches you when you are ill, helps you when you
lose your job or suffer an injury, and promises to be there for the long
term.
After legal and caregiving benefits, the third class of benefits may
be the most important of all. These are the social benefits of marriage.
As Jonathan Rauch has pointed out, marriage is the way a couple
signals the depth of its commitment to each other and signals that
commitment to families, to friends, to workers, and to communities.
That commitment is then reinforced by social expectations.
Professor Nagel3 made an excellent point in noting that at least
some of that social expectation may not apply initially to same-sex
couples because of resistance to the idea of gay marriage. However,
the most important socially-reinforced expectations come from
families and friends, people who are likely to be most supportive, even
initially, of the relationship that has just been entered. Perhaps the
whole social benefit will not be immediately captured, but it is
reasonable to expect that a large amount of it will.
In addition, there are the benefits to children. The children being
raised by gay couples would surely be better off if their parents could
be married, both for legal reasons and because of the enhanced
stability that their families would enjoy.
Any time you talk about gay marriage and children, you always
hear something like the following objection: A married mother and
father is the best environment for raising children. This is what
Professor Bradley calls the optimality view.4 It's essentially a
reasonable view-and it might be the correct view-but I think
Professor Bradley was correct to dismiss it, though perhaps not for the
reason that he gives.
The reason I would give for dismissing the optimality argument is
that it is largely irrelevant to the debate over same-sex marriage.
Here's why: No serious opponent of same-sex marriage advocates
removing children from their gay parents. No opponent in this
3. See Robert F. Nagel, Marriage and Practical Knowledge, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 37
(2008).
4. See Gerard V. Bradley, Three Liberal-but Mistaken-Arguments for Same-Sex
Marriage, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 45 (2008).
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symposium proposes that.
Whether or not gay marriage is allowed, children will continue to
be raised by gay parents in this country, and it will happen in
increasing numbers, as it has over the past several decades. The real
question on the table when it comes to the welfare of children is this:
Will these children be raised in homes that enjoy the protections and
benefits of marriage or will they not?
There are also communitarian benefits, that is, benefits for the
entire community, in the recognition of gay marriage. I go back to
Professor Bradley again because he asked exactly the right questions:
What would be the state's interest in recognizing same-sex marriage?
What would be the public purpose or interest in recognizing these
marriages? I can think of four.
First a possible communitarian benefit, or State interest, would
be that marriage by some measure, would better the lot of millions of
our fellow citizens who are living in gay families today. That is a
material and moral interest that we all have, and it cannot be easily
dismissed.
Second, there might be an advantage to limited government, or
the concept of limited government. Consider this: Married people
make relatively fewer demands on state welfare services and on the
healthcare system. The Congressional Budget Office in 2004
estimated that nationwide same-sex marriage would save the federal
government almost a billion dollars a year in healthcare and other
costs. More savings will occur at the state level. I am not proposing
same-sex marriage as a way to balance the federal budget, but a
billion here and a billion there adds up to real money. This savings
should serve the goal of limited government, something that
conservatives believe in, or used to believe in.
Third, gay life and culture in general could benefit from the
recognition of same-sex marriages. One concern often heard from
traditionalist conservatives is that gay culture is characterized by a
series of cultural pathologies: too much promiscuity, too much drug
use, too much alcohol abuse, too little personal responsibility, and too
little connection. One fear is that this culture will infect marriage and
somehow change it. I believe that particular fear is overblown as it
assumes a large effect from what will, after all, be a very small cause
because gay marriages will be a tiny proportion of all marriages. We
have been reminded repeatedly that gay people comprise such a small
portion of the population that they are irrelevant to the discussion
about marriage in the country. One has to turn around and ask: If
homosexuals are such a tiny minority, how is it that they will bring
[Vol. 50:93
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about the destruction of marriage?
However, if the concern is with gay culture itself, the question
then is this: What should the policy on marriage be? Should we allow
it or prohibit it for these couples? Could marriage have the sort of
traditionalizing effect on gay culture and individuals that
conservatives, and especially traditionalist conservatives, would
cheer?
Law has only a limited role in changing culture. Up to now the
law's role and the law's message to gay people has been entirely
perverse from a traditionalist perspective. Here's one way to think
about it: American law embodies a kind of asymmetry. On the one
hand, the law says to gay people, "Go out and have as much sex as
you like. You have a constitutional right to it." On the other hand, the
law says to these same people, "There will be nothing available to you
to channel all of that sexual activity into a productive, healthy, and
stable family life." I cannot think of another demographic group in
our society to which that double message is being sent. Because we
are not returning to the criminalization of sodomy-the question
really is: What do we do about the second half of that message? When
same-sex marriage is permitted, gay couples-to borrow the words of
Martin Luther King-will not be free at last. In a sense, they will be
bound at last-bound to traditions, to other people, to communities,
and to a culture.
These possible traditionalizing effects of same-sex marriage on
gay culture and life have led to a great deal of concern and anxiety on
the part of some activists on the left. Paula Ettelbrick, a well-known
lesbian writer and early critic of same-sex marriage, worries about this
effect:
Ironically, gay marriage, instead of liberating gay sex and
sexuality, would further outlaw all gay and lesbian sex which is
not performed in a marital context. Just as sexually active non-
married women face stigma and double standards around sex
and sexual activity, so too would non-married gay people. The
only legitimate gay sex would be that which is cloaked and
regulated by marriage. ... Lesbians and gay men who did not
seek the state's stamp of approval would clearly face increased
sexual oppression.5
I believe that reaction is exaggerated, but there's enough truth in
5. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK:
NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN QUARTERLY, Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAW 401,403 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
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it that I believe it should warm a traditionalist's heart.
Fourth, there might be a possible communitarian benefit to
marriage as an institution. Conservatives, I think, rightly worry that
there are a lot of problems with marriage today: high divorce rates,
lots of births out of wedlock, and very little respect for marriage. But
none of these threats to marriage were created by gay people.
Conservatives nevertheless say that this is a time of instability
and that it is risky to add to the pressures and strains on marriage by
making such an important change now. I have some sympathy with
that concern. There are possible unintended consequences of any
change, and we have to pay attention to them. But instead of being a
threat to marriage, consider that gay marriage might be a very small
part of its revival. Gay couples are now living together and are raising
more than a million children in this country, entirely outside of
marriage. As Jonathan Rauch has argued, their very existence is a
message to the culture that it is okay not to be married, that you can
raise your children, you can have a happy life, you can live a long
time, and you can do very well entirely outside of this institution.
Now, there are a lot of people who think that the message being
sent by all of these unmarried gay couples raising children outside of
marriage is a wonderful message. We need a multiplicity of family
structures and forms. These are terrific developments, they believe.
But I would not think that is the kind of message a traditionalist
would like very much. Gay marriage could reinforce the idea that
marriage is the normative status for people who are willing to make
the legal and social commitment that it entails.
This is exactly what sexual liberationists fear so much about
same-sex marriage. Consider, for example, what Michael Warner, a
professor at Rutgers, had to say about the possible effects of gay
marriage in a book he wrote a few years ago. The effect of gay
marriage "would be to reinforce the material privileges and cultural
normativity of marriage .... Buying commodities sustains the culture
of commodities whether the buyers like it or not. That is the power of
a system. Just so, marrying consolidates and sustains the normativity
of marriage.",6 My reaction to that is, "Well, just so." What Warner
fears, traditionalists should, at least in principle, cheer.
With all of that in mind, let us revisit the Burkean case against
the recognition of same-sex marriages, and look at the four points that
6. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 109 (1999).
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I raised earlier.
First, of course, gay marriage is a change; however, it is obvious
that not all change should be resisted. Burke himself recognized that
change is a means of society's preservation. I believe what the
Burkean approach would counsel is that gay marriage advocates, in
this debate, have the burden of proof. But it cannot be and should not
be an impossible burden.
Second, it is also true that the man-woman traditional definition
and understanding of marriage may embody a logic of its own that we
cannot fully appreciate or that we have somehow lost over time. That
urges a special caution on the part of reformers, but it does not
entirely defeat the argument in favor of same-sex marriage. The same
type of argument could be made any time a traditional practice has
been changed, from ending slavery to granting women the right to
vote. Also, it could be argued that while there have been a lot of
changes in marriage, nothing but man-woman marriages have existed
because we have never had man-man or woman-woman marriages.
Yet the same sort of thing could be said about any change in
marriage. Prior to the change we never practiced the thing that
changed. Every time we confront this question of whether we should
change, we could always confront the objection that we have never
done that before. Burke's insight about tradition is a warning to base
change on actual lived experience and not simply on reason. It is not a
command to resist all change.
Third, while some same-sex marriage advocates do in fact speak
in very abstract terms about their cause, gay couples and families are
not an abstraction. Their existence is not theoretical. They are not
people who happen to live under the same roof, who are joined
together only by a shared commitment to the philosophy of Michel
Foucault. Gay families are part of the lived experience of this country.
Fourth, is gay marriage really such a radical change that is
suddenly being forced upon us? As for whether it is really radical,
other marriage reforms in the past hundred years certainly seem to
have affected marriage much more comprehensively. Consider no-
fault divorce for example, which affects every marriage in a
jurisdiction that accepts that idea, or women's equality, which has
grown up over the past one hundred and fifty years. Both affect every
marriage involving a man and a woman. In comparison to that, gay
marriages will represent an incremental addition of perhaps three
percent in the number of married couples. If David Frum is correct in
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asserting that the take-up rate by same-sex couples has been very
small,7 then the numbers should be even smaller than that.
As for the suddenness of this change, gay families have in fact
been growing up around us organically for a century. They are not the
top-down creations of government bureaucrats or radical visionaries.
They are bottom-up facts of life.
Let me say a few things about pace and process. As I mentioned
earlier, Burke believed in a slow but well-sustained progress. Is that
what we have been witnessing? The truth is for some time in this
country that we have already been on an incremental path to the full
recognition of same-sex relationships.
First, I would include as part of this path the decriminalization of
sexual relations between people of the same sex which has occurred
since the drafting of the Model Penal Code and has occurred
legislatively and judicially over a period of about fifty years. I
mentioned earlier medicalization. A de-medicalization of
homosexuality has occurred in our society, particularly when the
American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list
of mental disorders in 1973.
An incremental path towards the recognition of same-sex
relationships started with private domestic partnership policies and
moved to some limited public recognition of same-sex relationships by
cities, counties, and states. As a result, we now have full same-sex
marriage in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada, and South
Africa. In some of those places, it was achieved legislatively. In others,
it was brought about judicially. And, of course, we now have it in
Massachusetts. More than that, we have civil unions, or the equivalent
of civil unions, in several more countries, including Britain, France,
Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. In the United States, we
now have it in Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Oregon, California, and more limited recognition in the state of
Washington. Almost all of those developments in the states have been
legislative rather than judicial developments. So, we have now
reached a point in this country where one-fifth of the population of
the United States lives in a jurisdiction where same-sex couples are
fully recognized under the law as equivalent to opposite-sex married
couples in all but name.
Now for the Burkean, what would be the steps ahead? First, there
7. See David Frum, Same-Sex Marriage: Unconservative in Purpose, in Application,
and in Result, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 85 (2008).
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should not be an immediate nationwide resolution of this issue either
in favor of gay marriage or against it. There should be no Supreme
Court decision telling the states they must recognize same-sex
marriages. There should also, however, be no federal marriage
amendment foreclosing state experimentation in this area.
Second, the reform toward gay marriage should continue to move
incrementally and with a strong preference that it move legislatively.
One of the advantages of this approach is that it is having a profound
effect on the debate over gay marriage. The debate about gay
marriage is moving from the realm of the theoretical and the abstract
into the realm of the experiential and the empirical. Increasingly, the
debate about gay marriage is not going to be about highfalutin
principles, but about issues such as divorce rates, marriage rates, and
illegitimacy. I think that is a Burkean development.
Consider one minor point in this regard. Eighteen years after
recognizing same-sex relationships in Scandinavia, there are higher
marriage rates for heterosexuals, lower divorce rates, lower rates for
out-of-wedlock births, lower STD rates, more stable and durable gay
relationships, more monogamy, and more respect for monogamy. So
far there is no slippery slope to polygamy, incestuous marriages, or as
Senator Rick Santorum once said, to man-on-dog unions.
Did same-sex marriage contribute to these retraditionalizing
trends? The answer is that we do not know. We have only a
correlation. But the evidence so far, I think, at least makes any claim
about doomsday scenarios very hard to credit.
Finally, given that gay people exist and are not going to be
eliminated or converted by any means acceptable to the American
people, the question for conservatives is now, "What is to be done
with them?" Is it better for our society and for traditional values that
they be pushed aside, marginalized and ostracized, and made to feel
alien to traditional values and institutions? Or is it better for society
and for traditionalists that they be included in the fabric of American
life, including in the most important social institution we have for
encouraging, recognizing, and reinforcing loving relationships?
I can understand why a feminist critic of marriage like Paula
Ettelbrick, or a libertarian, might want government out of all of this
and might therefore oppose same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage
might be a threat to their values. I have a harder time now
understanding why a traditionalist would.
Sometimes it seems that gay people are practically the last people
in the country who still believe in marriage, who are reaffirming its
importance in their lives with their very existence and their families,
2008]
104 SoUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:93
and who actually believe it can make their lives better. They are
saying "yes" to a traditionalizing institution. So the question for
conservatives at the end of the day is, why can't they take "yes" for an
answer?
